The aim of this chapter is to explore the analytic utility of the bottom-up approach from the perspective of transnational networks, and demonstrate its analytical purchase and limitation in the study of post-conflict state building. We focus on some of the key characteristics of networks that carry particular weight in accounting for the difficult process of state building in post-Communist, post-conflict context. While these show that the bottom-up approach is key to understanding their emergence during the conflict, it is less capable of explaining their adaptation and persistence in the post-conflict period. Hence, the chapter first charts the inclusion of civil society in the state building literature, and the limits of the approach within that literature. It then goes on to examine the process, the actors and the dynamics behind the blurring of the boundaries between public and private, internal and external, legal and illegal that is characteristic of transnational networks operating as actors in their own right in post-conflict zones. The chameleon-like quality of networks members that operate both as a part of civil society and as a part of the state is illustrated with reference to a Bosnian Croat and a Bosnian Serb transnational network created during the Bosnian war from 1992-1995. While this study of transnational networks relies on a single case study and within case study comparison, and therefore has findings that are limited in their generalizability, it does nonetheless aspire to speak to broader field of statebuilding.
In particular, it develops a model that can be tested in comparable cases of conflict following the collapse of a strong and illiberal state marked by the contestation for power among several sectarian groups, as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, it makes a case for a comparison of the transnationalization of conflict in the post-colonial context, such as Africa, and the post-communist context, as in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, and their legacy for post-conflict state building, given their distinct pre-conflict experience of statehood (cf. Kostovicova and BojicicDzelilovic, 2009, p. 4-5) .
The bottom-up critique of post-conflict statebuilding
External involvement in humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruction in conflict zones, from Haiti through to the Balkans and the sub-Saharan Africa to Iraq and Afghanistan, has become a norm in the post-Cold War world. Understanding distant conflict as an immediate threat in the increasingly globalized and interconnected world has shifted the focus of outside engagement in local state building. A panoply of external actors, including international and regional organisations, states and NGOs, have undertaken governance of a 'comprehensive nature' in the aftermath of conflict the world over (Caplan, 2005) . The establishment of legitimate political authority, understood as a democratic, accountable and selfsustainable state, was presumed to be a condition for security both within the boundaries of the post-conflict state and beyond.
Two decades into 'new interventionism', the relationship between peacebuilding and statebuilding is 'complicated, contingent and context-dependent' (Call, 2008, p. 3). Consequently, the original premise of statebuilding as an answer to conflict has 159 given way in the literature on the subject to the dilemmas and contradictions attendant in the process (Paris and Sisk, 2009 ). Of particular interest in this chapter is a recent shift in the scholarship towards a relational understanding of statebuilding, which emanates from the understanding of legitimacy as critical to the success of the enterprise. Recognition that a popular endorsement and buy-in into the statebuilding project is necessary has heralded a critique of a top down state building. The introduction of the 'people' and their politics as shapers of the statebuilding outcome follows the elaboration of legitimacy in these types of external interventions.
Statebuilding interventions are undertakings by external actors on behalf and in trust of the populations that are their beneficiaries. Therefore, the statebuilding exercise has an external and internal dimension of legitimacy (Knoll, 2008 , p. 294-8, Papagianni, 2008 . External legitimacy derives from the legal framework and normative justification of the statebuilding project. Internal legitimacy is constructed by local beneficiaries. The state under construction (the external statebuilders' project) is appraised by the local population against the benchmark of representation in terms of political community and that of its ability to provide public goods. These are referred to as input and output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999) . Kaldor refines the notion of input legitimacy as political legitimacy that 'includes a process of accountability and responsiveness to public debate that goes beyond formal participation and representation ' (2009, p. 186) .
Such a multifaceted conceptualization of legitimacy has opened up space for the bottom-up approach that is not just a complementary strategy to top down state building. On the contrary, the very credibility of the project rests on its endorsement by the local population. In this vein, Chandler's (2006) condemnation of statebuilding as 'empire in denial', itself an extension of a critique of state building as neo-imperialism, has at its core the evasion of accountability from the local population for the highly intrusive external governance. By contrast, recognizing the constraints of external statebuilding that by definition is illegitimate to the extent that it 'compromises sovereignty to create sovereignty' (Woodward, 2001) , others have explored how legitimacy can be constructed taking into account the views of recipients of statebuilding. The significance of including the 'locals' in the consultative process has been related both to the issue of consent (Knoll, 2007) and to effectiveness of governance (Zaum, 2007 , p. 238-9, cf. Chesterman, 2004 The consideration of local voices in the statebuilding enterprise includes two understandings of the bottom-up. Following a distinction between the external interveners and beneficiaries of state building, one understanding of the bottom-up includes the locals-as opposed to foreigners-conflating local elites and local civil society (Kostovicova, 2008) . The other understanding of bottom-up politics places emphasis on civil society. It is cognisant of contradictory processes in the postconflict political landscape where elected representatives may not necessarily be the best guardians of people's interests. Paddy Ashdown, the former High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, describes a lesson he received from a Serb refugee in Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-dominated entity. The refugee told Ashdown that the government was 'ripping off its own Serb refugees'. Instead of supporting their return home, it diverted the international aid to support Serbs from Bosnian Muslim areas to stay in RS, and, thus, solidify ethnic cleansing (Ashdown, 2007, p. 234-5) .
Consequently, the biggest challenge facing outsiders has been who should be included in the public participation and consultative processes (Papagianni, 2008 , p. 61-7, cf. Bhatia, 2007 . Scholars have turned to local civil society for an answer to the question of why the construction of legitimate political authority in post-conflict contexts has proved elusive thus far, and in particular why there has been resistance on the part of political elites to statebuilding. This inquiry has shown that civil society's constructive contribution to liberal peacebuilding and state building is potentially multi-faceted but cannot be taken for granted. The complex role of civil society actors after conflict, and specifically in relation to state building, is closely linked to a range of positions they occupy in relation to war-where some oppose wars but some also favour it (Kaldor, Kostovicova and Said, 2007) .
The multiple roles that civil society plays in post-conflict contexts correspond with different and not necessarily competing definitions of civil society. Their diversity can thus be seen to match the diversity of aims which civil society can help expedite: from forging interethnic reconciliation and assisting post-conflict democratization to monitoring the state and service provision. Hence civil society, conceived as a lively non-state sphere rich with associational life, can contribute to democratization: in the Tocquevillian tradition; in Putnam's sense where the creation of social capital can contribute to development; and in a Habermasian sense where civil society is understood as a space for civility, tolerance and debate. Thus civil society can potentially counteract divisive sectarianism (cf. Kostovicova, 2010, p. 371) . Spurke summarizes the complexity of approaches to analyzing civil society under two headings: actor-centred approaches that prioritise the performance and features of civil society actors, and functional approaches that hone in on the functions that civil society performs (2010, p. 20-5) . However, civil society can both contribute to and undermine peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. Therefore, although conceptualised as a space for civility, tolerance and debate (and thus an alternative route for restoring trust in multiethnic communities after the conflict) ethnic divisions have often been replicated and reinforced at the civil society level, as for example in Kosovo (Devic, 2006) . Civil society, or more precisely its illiberal or 'uncivil' segments, have emerged as an obstacle to interethnic reconciliation (Kostovicova, 2006) . They have thus underwritten rather than ameliorated the institutionalisation of ethnicity, as in Iraq or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Similarly, its role as a generator of political alternatives, as a monitor of government and state (Linz & Stepan, 1996 , p. 18, Brinkerhoff, 2007 , and as provider of policies and services enabled by external actors has been compromised in post-conflict contexts. Scholars have attributed civil society's inability to shape governance outcomes variously to: historical legacies of illiberal regimes (Howard, 2003) ; the sidelining of indigenous social organizations due to the international actors' bias towards engaging with NGOs (Howell and Pearce, 2001, p. 114, Pouligny, 2005) ; and the 'projectization' of civil society, whereby externally-driven policies of civil society building result in the proliferation of NGOs, as driven by donors' priorities (Sampson, 1996) .
The state-society relations perspective to statebuilding has certainly opened up an insightful analytical avenue. It shifted attention to the non-state explanation for challenges of building democratic and sustainable states after conflict. Specifically, it revealed that a combination of a weak state and weak civil society-that is, a double weakness-has proved particularly resistant to the transformation from a fragmented and exclusive state to consolidated and inclusive post-conflict statehood. Yet this analytical turn has also revealed its limitations. It has stopped short of questioning the very binaries, which initially facilitated the emergence of the bottom-up analysis as an alternative approach. It has not questioned either the local-global or the public-private distinction. Richmond argues that in reality state building confronts alterity and hybridity (2010, p. 173) . The transnational network approach, elaborated in the next section, captures this methodological in-betweenness. It offers a conceptual departure from the bottom-up civil society approach and demonstrates that binaries are analytically untenable in the post-conflict context.
The transnational network approach
The post-Cold War era has been characterized by proliferation of armed conflicts in which local rule has been challenged by various non-state armed groups, such as rebels, insurgents and warlords. Whilst commonly referred to as 'internal wars' or 'civil wars' in the absence of organized inter-state armed violence, these conflicts have been far from self-contained armed struggles. In fact, a distinctive feature of contemporary wars has been their transnationalization in scale, scope and complexity (Kaldor, 1999 , Keen, 2008 , Duffield, 2001 , Eilstrup Sangiovanni, 2005 . Several dynamics have been at work behind this process.
One concerns the ideological/political drivers of conflict. Most contemporary conflicts tend to have explicit identity overtones, which have worked to mobilize diasporas as a traditional transnational actor engaging in all stages and aspects of contemporary warfare. Thus, the role of diasporas has augmented and diversified; no longer are diasporas primarily acting as a funder, prudent investor in local economy and lobbyist for a homeland's political and economic causes, but it is also involved in combat, participates in local governance and pursues other less overt and less palatable causes in a way that can derail peacebuilding efforts.
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The second dynamic leading to transnationalization of contemporary conflict is related to the funding strategies of armed groups in the context when the monopoly of violence no longer exists and the depressed local economy cannot provide sufficient resources for war making. Financing violence in a global era forces armed groups, whether non-state or official military force, to search for alternative resources to wage and sustain war, which often involves resorting to illegal and criminal activities (Berdal and Wennmann, 2010, p. 191) . These have become the core of a war economy. This in itself implies linking up regionally and globally with organized crime as another typical transnational actor. Throughout conflict zones the world over there is ample evidence of expansion in transborder trade involving smuggling of legal goods, but also in outright criminal activity involving people, arms, precious stones, rare minerals and drugs trafficking as a result of both an active involvement of armed groups as well as the increasing presence of organized crime itself seeking opportunity to extract profit in a fluid legal framework of conflict-affected states.
Consequently, the most important channel through which those countries become integrated into the global economic and financial flows is through a myriad of informal and criminal activities of a war economy.
Lastly, contemporary conflicts are often associated with humanitarian emergencies as complex crisis endangering the local population so that no single agency can provide an effective response (Keen, 2008) . Hence, a plethora of international actors tend to be involved in various aspects of ameliorating the impact of armed violence and in working towards its termination-from humanitarian agencies, bilateral donors, and foreign governments to transnational nongovernmental organisations.
The multiplicity of diverse types of actors (including the prominent role of traditional transnational actors such as diasporas, organized crime and a range of non 165 governmental organizations) in contemporary warfare is only one facet of its distinct (transnational) nature. The other, and by far more crucial one in terms of its implications for peacebuilding, is the changing nature of political authority through the involvement and/or acquiesce of official military, security forces and other government actors in illegal and criminal activities and collusion with their agents.
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As a result the criminal, conflict, business and corruption agendas of various actors tend to converge through the conduct of the war economy, which results in their extensive collaboration and hence the creation of networks. In some cases a politicalbusiness-military-criminal nexus is created through networking, which from its dominant position is able to further enlarge the network by co-opting other social actors, by using patronage and award, and also through coercion and threat. A single actor can pursue several motives, for example personal wealth and power, and actors' motives can-and often do-change due to opportunities that violence creates so that military personnel turn into criminals, or criminals become politicians.
Network members move in and out of public office, never abandoning its control.
Further, a cursory look at the personal biography of any prominent node in such networks shows the impossibility of clearly deciphering those actors' roles, and motives as for example criminals, diasporas, warriors, businessmen or public office holders. Networks are held together by a unity of purpose; their participants share an interest in preserving wealth, status, power, authority and influence acquired through the engagement in the war economy but also impunity where crimes had been involved. In so far as war entails social transformation (Duffield, 2001) , as David Keen suggests, 'Where conflict has elevated some groups above the law, they may be reluctant to let go of their new status-a significant motive for keeping conflict going in some form. The point of war may be precisely in the legitimacy it confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes" (Keen 2008, p. 19-20) . those networks maintains a degree of legitimacy among the public through its capacity to provide a modicum of public goods within a framework in which ideological cohesiveness rekindled by their activity is paramount for the survival of their rule. Ultimately, when it comes to external state building, the undertaking should focus on the deconstruction of structures with little interest in building a system of legitimate rule, which is based on the commitment and capacity to mobilize developmental resources to the benefit of general public.
Notes
1 We use throughout the paper the terms 'networks' and 'transnational networks'
interchangeably.
2 Extraction of resources from the local population, through violence and extortion is also a strategy to generate resources for warmaking. 4 Through those activities complex relations were formed which did not end with the termination of the armed conflict.
5 Importantly, a crucial say in the formulation of Croatia's policy towards Bosnia-
